Seventy-five years ago, after Hitler’s suicide in his bunker in Berlin, his chosen successor, Grand-Admiral Donitz, was briefly the new leader of a Germany that, astonishingly, fought on for a few more days. Donitz did not concede defeat until 7th May, 1945.
It was a good indication that some parts of the German armed forces, especially many middle-ranking officers, were so wedded to the tenets of Nazi doctrine that they were prepared to continue the ‘struggle’ against the enemies of the Third Reich. Similarly, the more fanatical parts of the Waffen-SS, together with other loyalists in the Hitler Youth, appeared equally determined to fight to the death.
What had brought this about? Given that some Generals in the army had sensed as early as 1943 that Hitler’s regime simply could not win the war, why did a considerable number of high-ranking officers, soldiers and Nazi Party members still opt to fight on to the bitter end in April/May, 1945? It is a question I am often asked by students when I teach about Nazi Germany.
There are no simple answers. Plenty of excellent material is available, though, from historians such as Sir Richard Evans and Richard Overy and, later this year, Frank McDonough will offer his assessment. I often point students to the work of Sir Ian Kershaw and, in particular, his masterful book The End: Hitler’s Germany, 1944-45 (Allen Lane, 2011).
As Kershaw points out, after the failure of Hitler’s Ardennes offensive in December, 1944-January, 1945 (a last desperate military gamble known as the ‘Battle of the Bulge’), hundreds of thousands nevertheless carried on fighting for the regime. Moreover, in the parts of Germany still not captured or occupied by the Allies, even amid mounting evidence of military collapse in 1945, the Nazi state still managed to function, even into April and May.
Despite the lack of public transport, gas, electricity or water in many parts, the state bureaucracy still functioned, and there was no descent into widespread anarchy. Wages and salaries were still paid in April, 1945, and newspapers were still being published. Some cinemas remained open, and a last football match even took place between two Munich teams as late as 23rd April. While there was heavy fighting in some parts of Germany, other parts remained (relatively) untouched and orderly.
Furthermore, Kershaw notes in particular that the Wehrmacht (army) continued to fight, despite truly staggering losses (it is estimated that 300,000-400,000 German soldiers were being killed every month towards the end of the war).
Why such loyalty? Part of the explanation must surely be in the disciplined adherence to the Fuhrer shown by some of the High Command. Hitler, who was supreme leader and head of the armed forces, had made it very clear to his Generals that he would never contemplate any negotiations or allow another ‘cowardly’ surrender of the type he felt had occurred in November, 1918. Those who disagreed with him over military strategy or tactics were often dismissed.
Those who were left, such as Field-Marshal Keitel and General Jodl, were ultra-loyalists, and still had a kind of blind faith in Hitler. Hitler himself, now a pale shadow of his former self and clearly very ill, could still at certain moments exert a psychological hold over his top Generals. Similarly, until the very end, Admiral Donitz appeared convinced that nationalism and loyalty to the state remained supreme, and he was a fanatical advocate of the need to fight to the last. No wonder Hitler chose him as ‘successor’. Much of this determination to fight on filtered down to the junior ranks, who were reluctant to disobey orders or break their personal oath to Hitler.
In Kershaw’s estimation, another reason for Germans continuing to fight on lay in the regime’s use of terror. New laws and regulations implemented in late 1944 and early 1945, introduced partly in response to the earlier failed attempt on Hitler’s life by army officers in July, 1944, had equipped Party officials with even more powers of life-and-death over the civilian population. If anything, from about February, 1945, the Nazi regime’s system of terror increased to new and even greater levels, with intense fury directed at anybody deemed to be ‘disloyal’ or having doubts about the war effort, whether soldier or civilian. Many thousands of German soldiers were executed for desertion, while any ‘defeatist’ talk on the part of civilians could invite ‘brutal reprisal’ from Nazi officials.
Another major reason for Germans to continue fighting to the bitter end was undoubtedly their awareness of what the country’s armed forces had done in the East, especially in Russia. Terrible crimes had been perpetrated by German soldiers or the more obsessional Nazis of the SS, who had murdered many, many thousands in the name of ‘racial purity’ and the ‘cleansing’ of the local populations in German-occupied territories. There had been wholesale destruction of property and infrastructure and the enforced confiscation of resources on an unimaginable scale. Terror and rape had also been employed by German forces, or by those who had collaborated with the regime.
The fear of what the Russians would now do on German soil, and the strong sense that Soviet forces would be out for revenge, played heavily on the minds of German soldiers and, in practice, made them even more determined to fight for their homes, families and, indeed, their very survival. The powerful messages, speeches and newsreels of Joseph Goebbels (pictured), Hitler’s loyal Propaganda Minister, also ensured that the ordinary soldiers and their officers were kept aware of the fact that many German women faced the prospect of mass rape at the hands of Russian soldiers.
This became another strong incentive for German soldiers to fight on. Added to this, Goebbels very much played on the idea that the German nation was fighting to protect Germanic ‘civilisation’ from the onslaught of the Bolshevik ‘hordes’. In fact, at certain junctures, Goebbels claimed that it was not just German but ‘European’ civilisation itself that was now at stake, in danger of being destroyed by ‘sub-human’ Slavs directed by ‘Red’ Jews.
And, finally, the part played by Albert Speer, Hitler’s loyal architect who had been made Minister of armaments and war production, was also particularly important. Speer helped ensure, as far as he could, that the German troops remained fully supplied with weapons, and he had complete authority from Hitler to direct resources and increase efficiency as he saw fit. In fact, as Kershaw observes, Speer managed to perform ‘near miracles’ of organisation, which helped the regime to hold out for even longer than it probably would have done under another figure.
There are, of course, plenty of other factors to consider when seeking explanations for why the Nazis fought on, even after the death of Hitler. Significantly, even Donitz, the new Fuhrer, finally succumbed to reality and realised that defeat was inevitable. But, just in the few days of the existence of the post-Hitler regime, many more thousands had lost their lives.
A very small band of ultra-loyal Nazis also laid plans, first developed in 1944 as the so-called ‘Werwolf’ programme, to continue fighting beyond May, 1945, using a form of guerrilla warfare. It would seem that, for some individuals, they could never let go of Hitler’s beguiling hold, even though the Fuhrer was no more.
Dr. Steven Woodbridge is Senior Lecturer in History at Kingston University, Surrey
(Images: Wikimedia Commons)
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